Το Οχυρό Ρούπελ στο βιβλίο Constantine I and the Greek people,1920


Το Οχυρό Ρούπελ στο βιβλίο Constantine I and the Greek people,1920

CHAPTER XIV

FORT RUPEL

The by-elections in Chios, Lesbos, and eastern

Macedonia early in May resulted, as had been

expected, in a complete victory for the Venizelists : Elephtherios Venizelos himself was elected,

without opposition, in Lesbos. Even in eastern

Macedonia, part of which Venizelos, when prime

minister, had tried to turn over to Bulgaria, Constantine Jordanou, a Venizelist, carried the country by a small majority. Throughout newer

Greece, come under Greek rule only since the

Turkish war of 1912, Venizelos's policy of further increasing the size of Greece by accretions

in Asia Minor and Thrace appealed to the people.

Many of them had relatives, property, or interests in Asia Minor and Thrace. They wished to

see their friends and families freed of Turkish

rule ; what might happen to Greece as a result of

so large an increase in alien population—an an- nexation of territory extensively inhabited by

S21

CONSTANTINE I AND THE GREEK PEOPLE

Mussulmans as well as by Greeks—was a matter

of indifference. A Cretan himself, but a short

time in touch with any of the life or ideals of Old

Greece, Venizelos understood only this point of

view; he never appreciated that of the Greeks

proper. It was, therefore, among the newer

Greeks that he counted and still counts his supporters.

But while eager enough to see Greece vastly

increased in size through a general Alhed victory,

the inhabitants of the islands and eastern Macedonia shared the reluctance of the inhabitants of

Old Greece to accomplish this result by their own

unaided efforts. When, therefore, immediately

following elections in which the majority of the

voters had supported Venizelos's policy of a still greater Greece, the Bulgarians began preparations to invade eastern Macedonia, the inhabitants of eastern Macedonia were less pleased with

the prospect.

Meanwhile, the least conspicuous and most

effective of the Entente pressures put upon the

Skouloudis government, to force its resignation,

was having a marked effect. The financial situation of the country was exceedingly precarious,

222

FORT RUPEL

and the refusal by France and England to let the

Skouloudis cabinet obtain any monies abroad put

the Government in a desperate case. For this reason during the by-elections, while the Venizelists disposed of unlimited funds, lavishly spent,

the conservatives were unable to meet the ordinary campaign expenses, which are, in Greece,

proportionately greater even than in the United

States. The payments due the army had been

in arrears for some time, and the sums which the

families of mobilized men should have received

had never been paid since the mobilization had

begun. Cut off from the possibility of securing

money from abroad, Finance Minister Rhallys,

therefore, executed an arrangement with the

National Bank of Greece for a loan of one hundred fifteen milhon drachmae (some $23,000,000)

calculated to produce a hundred million drach- mae for the Government's use. Thirty million

of this amount was to be obtained by an additional issue of paper currency which the specie reserve of Greece fully justified, but which the

indebtedness of Greece rendered, possibly, a risky

financial operation. The Greek Government,

however, had no choice.

223

CONSTANTINE I AND THE GREEK PEOPLE

The proposed convention with the National

Bank upset the financial interests in France and

England at once. Both countries had financed

Greece for years and both realized fully the advantages which their financial hold on the country gave them in development of their trade with

Greece as well as, in times like the present, when

financial pressure could be brought to bend the

Greek Government to meet the political wishes

of the two larger powers. The Entente members of the International Financial Commission,

therefore, fought the conclusion of the projected

arrangement with the National Bank with every means. Nevertheless, the convention was signed.

The prospect of its ratification, and the conse- quent escape for Greece from their financial grip,

hastened the decision of France and England to

employ drastic measures in dealing with Greece.

The water transport of the Serbs was well on

the way to completion. The Entente diplomatists had lost their fight to force the Skouloudis

cabinet to permit a transport by land. Politically, this was a check to the Allies in Greece;

financially, the convention between the Skouloudis government and the National Bank was

2M

FORT RUPEL

another check. Militarily, the failure of the

Serbian adventure and almost eight months' inactivity of General Sarrail's army in Macedonia

were also prejudicial to Entente prestige in the near East. Every consideration pointed to some

sweeping change of policy on the part of the

Entente to regain the lost ground.

Two courses were possible : to cease supporting

Venizelos and the politicians and reach an agreement with King Constantine and the Greek

general staff for the military cooperation of

Greece with the Allies ; or to seek by force to turn

out the Skouloudis government, demand new

elections and provide Venizelos with every support to enable him to win them. The results in

Chios, Lesbos, and eastern Macedonia convinced

the Entente diplomatists that Venizelos would

sweep the country. They therefore chose the

latter course. From the moment General Sarrail assumed

supreme command of the Allied Orient armies

and the Greeks completed their evacuation of

Saloniki, General Moscopoulos, the Greek commander in Macedonia, had urged the French to

extend their lines to the east of the Struma River

225

CONSTANTINE I AND THE GREEK PEOPLE

and to take effective control of the Greek points

of strategic importance in that sector/ He ex- plained repeatedly that the Greeks, cut off from

their base of supplies at Saloniki, partially demobilized at the insistence of the Allies, and dependent upon an open roadstead as a port, were

in no position to resist successfully a strong at- tack from the north. Instead of extending his

line, however, General Sarrail had further emphasized the isolation of the Greeks by destroying

the Demir Hissar bridge, two and a half miles

south of the Greek Fort Rupel, on the east bank

of the Struma. Thus Fort Rupel was as effectually cut off as if it had been located in Bulgarian

territory. All the military embarrassments under which his troops labored, and which King

Constantine had exposed to Lord Kitchener, were ignored. The statement of the French and

British ministers that "the withdrawal of the

Greek troops from Macedonia would leave the

1 One thing is astounding : several months ago both French and

Greek oflScers pointed out to General Sarrail the importance of Fort Rupel and his advantage in taking possession of it. It is rather difficult to understand why this advice vi'as not followed,

the army at Saloniki being plenty large enough to permit this slight extension of the AUied front and numerous other points

having already been previously occupied.—"Gazette de Lausanne," No. 218, 1916.

FORT RUPEL

Allied powers indifferent" seemed to be the keynote of the Entente policy toward the Greek

forces in eastern Macedonia. At bottom the intention was undoubtedly so to weaken the position of the Greeks in this sector that any effort

to resist a Bulgarian advance single-handed

would be fruitless and the Greeks, to defend their

own territory from invasion, would be forced to

join the Allies.

Whether or not this was a deliberate, thoughtout policy on the part of the Entente, counting

for its success on the Greek fear of the Bulgars

and hostility to them, is not material. Certainly

Mr. Venizelos, in discussing an apocryphal declaration alleged to have been made by the Greek

monarch to the correspondent of the "Berliner

Tageblatt," of his conviction that "the Bulgarians

will evacuate the Greek territory when they shall

have driven their enemies out of Greece," showed

that he believed his king could not stand against

the anti-Bulgarian sentiment in Greece, and that a Bulgarian invasion would force the Greek

monarch to join the Allies whether mihtarily

prudent or not. No one seems, however, to have

counted the possible cost to the Allied arms of

227

CONSTANTINE I AND THE GREEK PEOPLE

this attempt to thrust the King of the Hellenes

into a corner, whence his only escape would be in

the Entente camp, should it fail. Yet the entire

policy of trying to force Greece into war through

the weakness instead of by the strength of her

military position ran counter to all that Constantine had frankly said to Lord Kitchener and

General Sarrail.

Every logic pointed to a retirement of the

Greeks before a Bulgarian advance. Two

months previously Venizelos had declared to me,

"I know that the orders have gone forth that if hostile armies enter the land we so recently

conquered, the Greek forces must withdraw and

permit the scene of our most glorious victories to

become the battle-ground of strangers." Precisely that took place on May 26. The Bulgarians appeared before Fort Rupel and demanded

its evacuation by the Greek troops, offering a

written guarantee that the fort with all its contents would be restored after the war, that private

property would be protected, and that the territory temporarily occupied would be evacuated

later. Prime Minister Skouloudis accepted the

offer, entering a formal protest against an act

FORT RUPEL

of hostility, which his government communicated

to the Entente ministers. Fort Rupel was

promptly abandoned by the Greek troops, who

first rendered its guns useless ; the Bulgarians oc- cupied the stronghold, precisely as the Allies had

occupied Fort Karabourhou and Fort Dova

Tepe. In speaking of the Government's action.

Premier Skouloudis characterized it as the only

practical course open to Greece.

Resistance, after the condition of helplessness to which

our armies in eastern Macedonia have been reduced by

the disposition the Entente have demanded of them,

would have been ridiculous. The best we could do was

to secure certain written guarantees, which were given us only on condition that we would not attempt resist- ance. Had we resisted, we should have been forced

into war and I fail to see what we should have gained

by it. The Venizelists seized the opportunitj'^ to

organize anti-Bulgarian meetings and to try to

inflame public feeling to war pitch. The French

minister in Athens consulted his government and

General Sarrail, and six days later made it plain

to Prime Minister Skouloudis that the surrender

of Fort Rupel would be taken by the French and

British governments as the ostensible reason for

the adoption of a still more drastic policy in deal229

CONSTANTINE I AND THE GREEK PEOPLE

ing with Greece. M. Guillemin informed the

Greek premier that the Entente considered the

surrender of Fort Rupel a violation of Greece's

promised "benevolent neutrality." He stated

that General Sarrail would take whatever measures the military situation created by this

act of the Greeks required, without previous

warning. On June 3, General Sarrail declared

martial law in all parts of Greece occupied by

the Entente. On June 6, Sir Francis Elliot

told the Greek Government that "if the German and Bulgarian advance into Greek territory continued unresisted, the consequences to

the Greek Government would be most serious."

The advance, however, seemed to halt at Fort

Rupel and the bridgehead of Demir Hissar, as Sir Francis himself admitted. Nevertheless, on June 6, an undeclared blockade of the

Greek ports began with great rigor, and every

effort of the Greek Government to obtain from

the Entente an explanation of the blockade or a statement of the terms upon which it would be

raised proved unavailing.

The Venizelists were more communicative.

They asserted, evidently with the knowledge of

230

FORT RUPEL

the Entente, that the blockade was to force the

resignation of the Skouloudis cabinet, the dissolution of the Boule and new elections, which

the Venizelists counted upon carrying. Their

pro-war propaganda at this moment was at its height. In reply to it. King Constantine, admitting the impossibility of defending eastern

Macedonia with the force he was permitted to re- tain and under the military conditions prevailing in that section, ordered on June 8, the demobilization of 150,000 men. At the same time the

French fleet occupied the island of Thassos, oif

Cavalla; but no Entente force was sent across the Struma to prevent any further Bulgarian

advance southward, and no effort was made to

replace the retiring Greeks in eastern Macedonia

by Allied troops.

On June 12, six days after the beginning of

the blockade, the Government decided to order

a complete demobilization. The Venizelist prowar propaganda, violent as all newspaper polemics in Greece are, inspired an equal anti-Venizelist propaganda on the part of the government

organs. Charges and countercharges resulted

finally in an attempt to assassinate King Con231

CONSTANTINE I AND THE GREEK PEOPLE

stantine by a mad Venizelist who cried that the

applause of which the Greek sovereign had just

been the recipient at a function in the Stadium

was "paid for by Baron von Schenck." The at- tempt was followed by a counter-demonstration

against the Venizelists in which a number of

Venizelist newspaper offices were stoned. To

the blockade the Entente added a further turn of

the financial screw by ruling Greek loans off the

London and Paris stock exchanges. The position of the Skouloudis government was plainly

untenable. The king sent to ^gena, where

Mr. Zaimis was spending the summer, and re- quested the former premier to consult with him

concerning the formation of a new cabinet.

At this moment a curious circumstance reveals

the position occupied by the entire Entente policy

in the near East. Neither the Greek sovereign nor his government had been able up to that moment to ascertain in what form the Entente would

make the demands conditional upon lifting the

blockade. But Mr. Venizelos and his followers were in no such ignorance. No sooner had the

king sent a destroyer to fetch Mr. Zaimis than

Mr. E. Repoulis, one of Venizelos's right-hand

2S2

FORT RUPEL

men, wrote the Cretan a hasty note acquainting

him with the fact, and urging the dehvery of the

Entente note at once, before the Skouloudis cabinet could resign and Mr. Zaimis, whose friendship for the Entente was well known, could be

installed as premier. Mr. Respoulis wrote quite

as if not the Entente, but Mr. Venizelos himself, were the author of the Entente ultimatum and

were directing the diplomatic action of the Allies.

His thought was plainly not to see certain guarantees obtained for the Entente, but to draw out

of the embarrassing position of the Skouloudis

government the maximum advantage for Venizelos and his partizans. As far as Repoulis and

Venizelos were concerned, the Entente did not

figure in the situation, save as a mere instrument

to the forwarding of the political fortunes of

Venizelos and his followers. Thanks to the

prompt action of Venizelos, on Mr. Repoulis's

representations, the Entente ultimatum was presented the following day, June 21, before King

Constantine could constitute a cabinet whose

character would render the presentation of any

ultimatum superfluous.

Η περιοχή μας και η ανατύναξη της γέφυρας του Δεμιρ Ισσάρ, στο βιβλίο Constantine I and the Greek people,1920

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